Argument from Intimidation — Ayn Rand Lexicon ”Let me emphasize that the Argument from Intimidation does not consist of introducing moral judgment into intellectual issues, but of substituting moral judgment for intellectual argument. Moral evaluations are implicit in most intellectual issues; it is not merely permissible, but mandatory to pass moral judgment when and where appropriate; to suppress such judgment is an act of moral cowardice. But a moral judgment must always follow, not precede (or supersede), the reasons on which it is based.” “The Argument from Intimidation,” The Virtue of Selfishness, 143

RRD: I should note that I believe that it is possible to say something that is–in its effect–a argument from intimidation, but to do so without a malicious intent.

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